I am a sixth-year Ph.D. student in Economics at Boston University.
I work primarily in macroeconomics and monetary economics, with secondary interests in
corporate finance and econometrics.
I will be on the 2026/2027 academic job market.
Here is my CV.
Job Market Paper
with Markus Schwedeler
Abstract
How do firms’ planning horizons—defined as how far into the future they explicitly reason—shape
investment and the transmission of monetary policy?
We construct a firm-year measure of revealed planning horizons from corporate earnings
calls by developing an algorithm that detects explicit future time references. The measure
reveals large and persistent cross-firm heterogeneity, only partly explained by firm
fundamentals and also associated with corporate governance. Using high-frequency monetary
shocks at different points on the yield curve, we show that firms with longer planning
horizons cut investment more in response to forward-guidance tightening but less to
current-rate tightening. To rationalize these facts, we develop a New Keynesian model of
investment with heterogeneous finite planning horizons and calibrate it to our measured
distribution. The calibrated model successfully reproduces the observed differences in
investment responses without targeting them, giving empirical content to theories of
limited forward reasoning. Unlike benchmark models, where more distant forward guidance
becomes steadily stronger or weaker, ours implies that forward guidance is most powerful
when rate changes are one to two years ahead.
Working Papers
with Markus Schwedeler
Abstract
We study how institutional ownership affects managers’ attention to the future, which we
measure using the temporal references in managers’ forward-looking statements on U.S.
corporate earnings calls. Firms whose managers pay more attention to the future invest more,
spend more on R&D, and file more valuable patents in the following year, and their attention
to the future falls when financial conditions deteriorate. Our central finding is that attention
to the future rises with the share of institutional ownership and the number of institutional
owners but falls with the stake of the largest institutional owner, the blockholder. We interpret
these patterns by building a model of managerial attention. Informed trading by institutions
rewards managers for looking ahead, whereas intervention by the blockholder discourages
managerial initiative. Consistent with the model, we find empirically that the negative effect
of the blockholder’s stake is weaker when insiders hold more equity in the firm.
with Emanuele Dicarlo, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and Mauro Marè
NBER WP
In the media
Vox-EU
lavoce.info
Abstract
This study uses fiscal gap accounting (FGA) and generational accounting (GA) to
compare US and Italian fiscal solvency. FGA and GA incorporate all government outlays
and receipts, whether put on or kept off the books. FGA measures, in the form of reduced
net outlays, the constant share of each future year’s GDP needed to balance the
government’s intertemporal budget. GA calculates the lifetime net tax rate – lifetime
taxes divided by lifetime labor earnings -- facing future generations if current
generations pay nothing more, on net, than current policy mandates. Deficit accounting
suggests that Italy’s 135 percent debt-to-GDP ratio places it in worse fiscal shape than
the US with its 123 percent ratio. But on a fiscal-gap basis, Italy appears in far better
shape regardless of the discount rate used. Based on the theoretically appropriate rate –
the average real return to national wealth, the U.S. fiscal gap is 7.4%. Italy’s is 4.0%.
These requisite solvency adjustments are far larger if delayed or if the UN’s more
pessimistic demographic projections prevail. Neither country can expect future generations,
on their own, to cover their government’s red ink. Doing so requires levying lifetime net
tax rates, in each country, that exceed 100%.
with Pierre Perron
Abstract
Consider a linear model y = Xβ + u with u = (u1,...,uT) and
ut a serially correlated linear process given by ut =
∑∞j=-h cj et-j for a sequence of innovations
et. Given a set of instruments Z, the “optimal GMM” estimator based on the
moment condition E(Zu) = 0 is by far the most commonly used method to estimate such
models. It can, however, be inconsistent unless the instruments are exogenous with
respect to past innovations et-j for j > 0, when cj ≠ 0 for j > 0.
We propose a GLS-IV estimator valid in the general case with instruments exogenous or
not, as long as they are pre-determined. It is shown to be much more efficient than GMM
whether the moment condition E(Zu) = 0 is satisfied or not. We discuss issues of
consistency by casting the estimators in a GMM framework with different moment
conditions and instruments. To analyze the relative merits of the estimators when all
are consistent, we cast them as some GLS estimator using different instruments and
first-stage regression. It then becomes clear that GLS-IV involves “stronger instruments”,
while GMM is more likely to be affected by issues of weak instruments. Other motivating
elements and extensive simulations are presented to argue that our proposed GLS-IV
estimator has better properties. As an empirical application, we revisit the extensive
study of Mavroeidis et al. (2014) about the empirical relevance of the forward looking
New Keynesian Phillips curve. Using the GLS-IV procedure on the same dataset, our
estimates are all in the right quadrant, consistent with theoretical expectations.
Teaching
Teaching Fellow, Econometrics (EC 508), Department of Economics, Boston University,
Fall 2025.